HOW MIGHT THE WORLD’S NAVIES CONTRIBUTE TO AND BENEFIT FROM THE ‘1000-SHIP NAVY’ PROPOSAL?
A simple list, navy by navy, with actual and perceived contributions and benefits, would answer the question posed. Of more use, would be to understand the strategic factors driving the concept’s development and to consider whether it will be pursued if it does not bring measurable benefits to the United States of America. It is conceivable that current legislation, international bodies, smaller multilateral groups, other national agencies and commercial bodies are already fulfilling the function of a ‘1000-Ship Navy’.
National Interest
“The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and we must work together to stop proliferation.”
With those words to the Polish people on 31 May 2003 at Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow, President Bush introduced his Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). By the time he returned to Poland in June 2006, the related White House Press Release[1] trumpeted that “since the initiative was launched, the PSI has grown from a handful of nations to a global partnership of more than 70 countries from all around the world.”
In March 2004, as part of his command’s annual testimony to the US Congress, Admiral Tom Fargo, the Combatant Commander for all the US Joint Forces in the Pacific Command, raised the issue of a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). RMSI was intended to develop a partnership of willing regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws.
By September 2005, at the seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mike Mullen USN posited his vision of a ‘‘1000-Ship Navy’ which by October 2006 he was to describe to the Honolulu Advertiser as a “global maritime Partnership”.[2]
Helen of Troy, wife of Menelaus, King of Sparta, is known to us as the face that launched a thousand ships, the number of warships the Greeks were said to have taken to Troy to retrieve her. It is unlikely that some 3000 plus years since Helen eloped to Troy with Paris that it will prove as easy for Admiral Mullen of Los Angeles to achieve the feat of maritime unity he envisages. That is to say: “ a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world….a fully interoperable force – an international city at sea.”[3]
In answering the question posed above it is essential to understand that it is US foreign policy imperatives that drive the concept, nothing more and nothing less. This is not a criticism of America. Despite Admiral Mullen’s words, navies are not designed to be ‘freedom-loving’ but tools of their political masters. No other navy will contribute or benefit except as a direct result of its own government’s policy decisions to support, acquiesce or obstruct the progress of a ‘‘1000-Ship Navy’.
The KISS Principle
That the foreign policy of the United States desires to exploit the security potential of the global maritime community in its fight against the spectre of evil is completely understandable. It is certainly laudable from the American taxpayer’s perspective. Americans, by nurture now think ‘big’. Thus there was no early hesitation to use the word ‘Global’ in the phrase Global War on Terror/ism, or GWOT. Regrettably, too often they also think ‘simple’. It is a nation with so many sophisticates and intellectuals yet among 300 million fellow Americans they are very thinly spread. A foreigner listening to the President’s first State of the Union address following 911 could not help but be struck by the audacious over-simplification in his tendentious statement that “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming (sic) to threaten the peace of the world.[4]
When considering how the world’s navies might contribute to and benefit from the CNO’s ‘1000-Ship Navy’ we might wish to bear in mind that it is a concept that perfectly fits the ‘big’ and ‘simple’ approach favoured by the world’s only remaining superpower. The United States was the target of 911. That others in the international community suffered losses and that one of the three intended targets was the ‘World’ Trade Centre should not distract from the principal target which, viewed through a set of Al Queda ‘effects-based’ spectacles, was entirely focused on changing US foreign policy. However, would even the most strategically minded terrorist have foreseen, that among the secondary and tertiary effects of 911 would be the alienation, to one degree or another, of many important players in the international community from US Foreign Policy and the US itself?
Policy bi-products of US hegemony have seen the world protesting in the past, most notably during the Vietnam War. In simple terms, the dilemma the US faced after 911 was either to rely on international bodies for appropriate and timely action that would effectively support US policy, or to go it alone while manipulating their scores of bilateral relationships to achieve policy goals. The former would have maintained the sympathy vote and who knows, possibly in the longer term achieved internationally binding success. The latter seems more attractive to the independent, frontier spirit and gratifies a concomitant supposition that immediate and positive results will follow. Either option would have followed the ‘Keep It Simple Stupid’ principle. Unfortunately the Bush administration chose to merge the two and so a dependence on ever shifting coalitions and partnerships has developed as a result.
Walking the Talk
However, that PSI has had such a degree of success that the President can claim a global partnership of more than 70 countries is highly questionable. If repeated often enough people will start to believe it but China and India remain notably absent and, as the Congressional Research Service has consistently noted it is unclear what “support” means. According to information released by the State Department, requirements for support appear to be fairly weak.[5] Nevertheless, it can be argued that the PSI’s initial vim from its eleven original members provided much of the impetus to support the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. That was the first ever Security Council resolution on non-proliferation issues, adopted in April 2004. The resolution “calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.”[6] However, two years later a further resolution was necessary to encourage the international community to meet the requirements of the first.
Much less successful, although less global[7] in its approach than the PSI was CINCUSPACOM’s RMSI. Just three months after Admiral Fargo’s suggestion that the PACOM-led initiative could include the US Navy conducting deterrent patrols in the Straits of Malacca, Donald Rumsfeld himself had become “very cautious in suggesting the involvement of US troops in securing the straits, while nevertheless making it very clear that the country has strategic interest in the channel.”[8] There is no doubt that the RMSI initiative, particularly with regard to what the world is encouraged to see as a pirate-infested channel, set off alarm bells in the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia. With both nations alert to the threat to their sovereignty and well versed in international maritime law, RMSI became effectively and embarrassingly dead in the water. However, US military relations with both countries continue to improve and Malaysia recently extended its bilateral military agreement with the US for a further ten years.
The CNO’s ‘1000-Ship Navy’ concept is a natural progression from the geographically and politically hamstrung RMSI and the limited, in terms of proliferation, PSI. Each of the five US Combatant Commanders, whose areas of interest cover the globe, supports his government’s foreign policy through a separate Theatre Engagement Plan, now known as a Theatre Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). The TSCPs are fully coordinated with the military staffs in US embassies. They aim to integrate available resources, for example, security assistance, military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and outreach programs and form them into a coherent, mutually supportive set of activities for each country. Each TSCP is broadly similar in concept to a smaller nation engaging in defence diplomacy in its region through an international engagement plan. The CNO’s global vision of a ‘1000-Ship Navy’ logically could be expected to integrate the appropriate maritime air, surface and sub-surface capabilities into each Combatant Commander’s TSCP. There is no indication this occurs, although inevitably there will be coincidental synergies between concept and TSCPs. In terms of command and control it would have been preferable for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose and champion the ‘1000-Ship Navy’, encouraging closely coordinated joint force integration in its support.
It would be naïve of any nation to trust that TSCPs exist for the mutual benefit of the USA and themselves. The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Security Strategy of the United States exist to protect current national security arrangements, dissuade military
competition, deter threats to vital interests, and defeat enemies that cannot be deterred. In 2002 Admiral Fargo expressed it thus: “Pacific Command operationalizes national security strategy and national military strategy with a regional emphasis”.[9] By 2006 the focus for PACOM was divided into five areas:
- prosecuting and winning the war on terror
- maturing joint and combined warfighting capabilities and readiness
- ensuring the credibility of operational plans
- advancing regional security cooperation, and
- posturing forces for agile and responsive employment.[10]
Equally the CNO’s enthusiasm for his ‘1000-Ship Navy’ is driven not by philanthropy but national interest. A year after introducing the ‘1000-Ship Navy’, Admiral Mullen was urging positive steps to act quickly to develop global maritime partnerships. He describes three ‘compelling’ reasons to do so: the rapid pace of globalization, that the threats faced are real and pervasive and finally the ‘carrot’ of significant technical progress. It is not at all surprising that the CNO of the world’s greatest economy would state:
“We are all now connected. We all face the same dangers. We all share the same opportunities. And since most of the world’s commerce still travels by sea – some 90 percent – the opportunities before us in maritime security have become more critical and more promising. In this global era, the economic tide of all nations rises – not when the seas are controlled by one – but rather when they are made safe and free for all.”[11]
The United States economy is potentially the biggest loser if Admiral Mullen’s “ideologues, pirates, proliferators, criminals, and terrorists”[12] succeed, but succeed in what, and to what degree, and how to define their success? The CNO’s target set appears now to have grown radically beyond terrorism. A cynic might claim that without 911 and terrorism as its catalyst, PSI, RMSI and the ‘1000-Ship Navy concept would not have seen the light of day. The broad expansion of the latter to include ‘pirates, proliferators and criminals’ appears to be a matter for police and coast guard forces, not the world’s navies, not to mention the safeguards comprised within existing international law. Malaysia’s new Maritime Enforcement Agency is perhaps one example of a more appropriate response to the threat Admiral Mullen describes.
Contributions
Navies around the globe possess assets which, combined with sufficient political will and direction, could contribute to the ‘1000-Ship Navy’. For example, they may employ direct force, interdiction and boarding, establish a presence by patrolling or conduct intelligence gathering. To undertake any role or a specific mission in support of this global partnership would require information. At the September 2003 PSI meeting a number of guidelines were agreed for information exchanges which are equally relevant for the development of the ‘1000-Ship Navy’. The thorniest issue is to what extent participants are expected to contribute to the timely sharing of information to be used for the identification, monitoring, disruption or interdiction of illegal activities? Each nation, whether acting independently or in an alliance will have defined national release criteria for naval intelligence. Each nation can be expected, for example, to have clearly defined rules for releasing information about intelligence platform capabilities. In the short term it would be naive to expect national release policies to change. It has taken the impetus of two Gulf Wars for the USA to reconsider its release of military information to its two closest military allies.
Benefits
Where nations can reach agreement on information sharing, the benefits of the ‘1000–Ship Navy’ could include developing best practices and interoperability where units operate together or boundaries of operations coincide. Information sharing may help improve communications and strengthen trust or at least further develop mutual understanding. With the help of more sophisticated neighbours or input from the US it may lead to the introduction of new technologies. Doctrine and tactics will also benefit from a different focus while combined training and exercises offer other opportunities to improve.
When decisions are made for navies to operate together to support the concept there may be substantial operational benefits which follow increased cooperation. In September 2005 following a Malaysian proposal, four nations[13] began joint aerial “Eyes in the Sky” maritime patrols over the Malacca Strait in order to counter perceived threats of piracy and terrorism in this vital waterway. The three littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had already begun coordinated sea patrols of the waterway. Such initiatives may or may not have come about through international pressure but the resulting dialogue, exchange of personnel, increasing trust in each other’s capabilities and knowledge of operations are the positive benefits envisaged by Admiral Mullen’s ‘1000-Ship Navy’ concept.
Those willing to get on board with similar initiatives can expect support from US Combatant Commanders in the form of targeted capacity building, military financing, the infusion of security assistance funding and other types of security cooperation activities seen as essential to the execution of U.S. strategy in combating terrorism. Combined with diplomatic support and initiatives, these measures, at a relatively low cost to the US, can provide a heady and worthwhile mixture for smaller states. Singapore and the US signed a Strategic Framework Agreement in July 2005 recognising Singapore as a major security cooperation partner. This agreement, and the supporting Defense Cooperation Agreement, solidifies strategic access to Singapore for visiting US Forces. The Singapore Navy is unlikely to regret allowing the USN onto its dance card, yet such initiatives re-emphasise the delicate balancing act the US is required to conduct in its strategic relationships as weather eyes are cast from Malaysia and Indonesia.
The Big Picture
However, the involvement of the world’s navies is only a small part of the solution for the ‘1000-Ship Navy’ concept. Christopher Cavas has described the difficulties of intercepting an imaginary shipping container containing biological hazards destined for the hands of terrorists and concludes: “Stopping this threat and other forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from making their way across the world’s oceans is a challenge for the U.S. Navy”.[14] In fact it is not a challenge for the navy but for national and international law enforcement agencies and for the US government. The State Department sees controlling and managing such a threat as a part of ‘Transformational Diplomacy’. If someone is to fulfill a ‘globo-cop’ role in securing the maritime domain before ships enter the area of interest of the Department of Homeland Security, pragmatically it will be the State Department, not the US Navy. Transformational Diplomacy sees partnerships, both established and yet to be realized, as the key to protecting the global maritime supply chain against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The State department is right to see cooperation between the public and private sectors as critical.
“The Secure Freight Initiative is a demonstration of a multi-lateral partnership in that both foreign governments and privately-owned maritime terminal operators have teamed together with us to improve our ability to scan U.S. bound cargo with radiation detection equipment and non-intrusive imaging equipment for nuclear and other radiological materials.”[15]
The US has created a global initiative with partners as diverse as Kazakhstan and Morocco to work with the private sector to enhance the implementation of the Global Initiative Principles espoused by Condileeza Rice. These principles include best security practices for private firms, developing new technology, such as in enterprise risk management and biometric identity verification tools, and inevitably, strengthening information sharing.
There are, of course, not only national but bilateral and multilateral partnerships to be more fully exploited in developing maritime domain awareness essential to the ‘1000-Ship Navy’, for example, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. International maritime organisations already play a crucial role. International maritime institutions provide a large number of legal acts without which, oceanic anarchy would result. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has specific powers under the UN Law of the Sea Convention that puts it in a position to actively develop new standards that require adherence by the international community. After 911, the IMO brought out new regulations to deal with security on certain categories of vessels and the port facilities with which they interface, affecting established regulations like the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.
The Future
Since 911, great strides have been made to increase the security of the homeland of the USA. Given the global economy and the US reliance on trade, the Bush administration quickly came to terms with the notion that it could not take those steps in isolation. The various partnerships previously described together with many other initiatives including regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq have been the individual notes of an orchestra’s many musicians contributing to the opus of the GWOT.
The difficulties encountered in the intervening five or so years have owed more to the lack of an original harmonic score rather than of talent from the individual musicians or sections within the orchestra. Time should have been set aside to develop an original score, IE. a comprehensive inter- and intra-agency Shaping and Influencing Plan, (in US parlance ‘Strategic Communications’). Had such a score been composed with international venues and an international audience in mind, it is possible there would by now be applause and requests for an encore, rather than requests for refunds. For as recently as February, the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer stated “anti-American feeling in Europe is playing into the hands of al-Qa’eda…obviously America’s enemies take comfort from continual attacks on America by America’s friends”.[16]
It is within the global context of US international relations and international commerce that the concept of ‘1000-Ship Navy’ will see victory or defeat. The dependence of almost all governments on trade may well influence its victory, but it unlikely to be recognized as such nor is Admiral Mullen likely to be given the credit for as has been described above, many of the ‘ships’ are already positioned and are, quite rightly, not controlled by admirals.
Today the US itself is still coming to terms with how its own government will seamlessly integrate its individual agencies in the war on terror. Initially, it may have overlooked some of the international maritime organisations and legislation that are already in place. This does not appear to be the case today and in principle US policy supports Admiral Mullen’s vision of a global maritime partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies. However, the present administration has yet to fully comprehend how to carry the international community with it in order to avoid Lenin’s ‘one step forward two steps back’ nor is it not entirely clear that another new ‘partnership’, one of a ‘1000-Ship Navy’ is actually required nor, if it does emerge, how equal the individual national partners may be in relation to one another. Regrettably, the ultimate success of the CNO’s vision will depend entirely on political pragmatism and commercial forces rather than the goodwill of the international naval community.
Bibligraphy
Websites relating to footnotes:
- http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/
- http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/Honolulu_Advertiser_October_29_2006.pdf
- http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen050921.txt
- http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf
- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0532.pdf
- http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2006/DAR-FY07-Fallon%2003-07-06.pdf
11.http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/WPNS%20CNO%20remarks%20as%20delivered(2).pdf
- http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/12/2336959
- http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/79524.htm
- http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/02/09/woz09.xml
[1] White House Press Release 23 June 2006.
[2] Honolulu Advertiser 29 October 2006: Commentary – We Can’t Do It Alone
[3] ADM Mike Mullen Remarks as delivered for the 17th International Seapower Symposium Naval War College, Newport, RI September 21 2005. The symposium’s theme was: a global network of maritime nations for a free and secure maritime domain.
[4] The President was referring to North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
[5] CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS21881 Updated 14 September 2006.
[6] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004.
[7] The PACOM area of interest extends to only 47 countries.
[8] The Jakarta Post – June 9, 2004.
[9] “Operationalizing the Asia Pacific Defence Strategy” – Joint Force Quarterly 2002.
[10] Statement Of Admiral William J. Fallon, US Navy Commander USPACOM before the Senate Armed Services Committee 7 March 06.
[11] Remarks by Admiral Mullen to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 31 October 2006.
[12] The Webster’s revised unabridged dictionary 1998 describes an ideologue as one given to fanciful ideas or theories; a theorist, a spectator. It is questionable whether the CNO meant to include idealogues in his list.
[13] Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore
[14] Christopher Cavas: Armed Forces Journal article “The Thousand-Ship Navy” 2007
[15] Transformational Diplomacy to Protect the Maritime Supply Chain, a speech by
Andrew Grant, Deputy Director State Dept. to the Marine Log-sponsored Maritime and Port Security Conference Crystal City, VA January 23, 2007
[16] UK Daily Telegraph report Friday 9 Feb 2007